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Abstract.
The implementation of decarbonization policies depends crucially on the public’s willingness to
pay for them. We use stated preference methods to investigate the public’s preferences for such
policies. We ask three research questions. First, does the willingness to pay (WTP) for each ton
of CO2 emissions reductions depend on the policies and on individual characteristics of the
respondents? Second, how extensive is the variation associated with these factors? Third, what
factors affect support for or opposition to a carbon tax? Based on the responses to discrete choice
experiments from a sample of Italians, we find that the WTP per ton of CO2 ranges between € 6
and 130, depending on whether the public program is based on taxes, incentives, informationbased approaches or standards. Further allowing for individual characteristics of the respondents,
such as gender or education, and knowledge of climate change, results in a 300% change in
WTP, holding the policy instrument the same. We conclude that the variation associated with the
policy instrument is approximately of the same order of magnitude as that associated with
individual characteristics of the respondents.

JEL Classification: Q41 (Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices); Q48 (Energy: Government
Policy); Q54 (Climate; Natural Disasters; Global Warming); Q51 (Valuation of Environmental
Effects).
Keywords: climate change mitigation; WTP per ton of CO2 emissions reduced; choice
experiments.
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1 Introduction
Growing concerns about climate change (IPCC, 2007, IPCC, 2014) have spurred efforts
to estimate the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions mitigation strategies (e.g., Nordhaus 1994,
2007; Tol 2005; Stern 2007; Agrawala et. al. 2011). One approach to estimating such benefits is
to list all of the possible physical and societal effects of climate change, attach a monetary value
to each of them, and then compute the sum of such values (Nordhaus, 1994). Alternatively, one
may use variation in temperatures across locales and over time and regression analyses to infer
losses or gains to society (Mendelsohn et al., 2000).2 Finally, one could simply ask the
beneficiaries of the mitigation policies to state their willingness to pay for them.
Tol (2013) provides an exhaustive survey of the literature on the damages of climate
change. Tol’s meta-analysis spans over 588 estimates from 75 published studies, finding that
“The mean estimate in these studies is a marginal cost of carbon of $196 per metric ton of carbon
(tC), but the modal estimate is only $49/tC. Of course, this divergence suggests that the mean
estimate is driven by some very large estimates.” Converting these figures from carbon to CO 2
yields a modal value of 13.36$/tCO2, while the mean is 53.45$/tCO2 (1995 US$).
Studies that have used stated preference methods to elicit the public’s willingness to pay
for mitigation include Berk and Fovell (1999), Roe et al. (2001), Berrens et al. (2004), Li et al.
(2004), Li et al. (2005), Nomura and Akai (2004), Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006), Brouwer et al.
(2008), MacKerron et al. (2009), Achtnicht (2012), and Alberini et al. (2016). Tol (2013)
reviews these and other studies, and concludes that laypeople are generally more pessimistic
about climate change than are the experts. In general, however, the amount of money that people
are prepared to pay for carbon taxes is in line with estimates of the social cost of carbon based on
the other approaches: The WTP per metric ton of CO2 emissions reductions from stated
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preference studies ranges from a few to a few thousand dollars (or euro) per ton. For example,
Longo et al. (2008) estimate the WTP to be $967 per ton based on a sample around the city of
Bath in the UK, and Longo et al. (2012) from € 26 – 332, depending on the scenario, from a
sample of residents of the Basque Country (2008 €).
Casual inspection of these studies suggests that such a large range of estimates might be
driven by the different populations surveyed and the different characteristics of the mitigation
plans individuals were asked to value. For example, Löschel et al. (2013) and Diederich and
Goeschl (2014) derive the WTP per ton of CO2 emissions directly through a purchase of
European Union Allowances, while Löschel et al. (2010) specify the distributional impacts of the
policies.3 Brouwer et al. (2008) and Achtnicht (2012) infer the WTP per ton from the price
respondents are willing to pay for private goods such as travel and cars, for which emissions and
emissions rates are likely to be secondary attributes.
It is also possible that the WTP estimates from stated preference studies depend on the
valuation method used, namely whether respondents are asked to report information about their
willingness to pay to obtain a policy (contingent valuation) or choose among policies with
different characteristics (choice experiments). For example, a meta-analysis by Allo and
Loureiro (2014) indicates that the willingness to pay for CO2 mitigation plans is systematically
lower in studies that deploy choice experiments.
In this paper, we follow the stated preference approach based on choice experiments to
estimate the WTP per ton of CO2 emissions reduced. We ask three research questions. First, does
the WTP per ton change with the characteristics of the policies or the individual characteristics
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Dietz and Atkinson (2010) examine tradeoffs between efficiency and equity considerations in two schemes, one for
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of the respondent, or both? Second, how extensive is the variation associated with these factors?
Third, what factors affect support for or opposition to a carbon tax?
We focus on public policies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from energy use and use of
renewables in people’s homes, and we clearly specify the baseline, namely the emissions
generated by the average household in a year through the use of electricity, gas and other fuels at
home. Our policies are described by a total of five attributes: 1) the goal of the policy (to
improve energy efficiency, which should save energy and therefore emissions, or encourage
shifting energy generation to renewable sources), 2) the specific mechanism (a carbon tax,
incentives, standards, information-based policies, and combinations thereof), 3) the reduction in
CO2 emissions for the average household (in tons per year and as a percentage of the baseline),
and 4) the cost of the policy to the respondent’s household (on an annual basis). Respondents
were told that the policy would entail payments and emissions reductions for 10 years. Our
choice experiments are administered to a sample of Italian households in July 2014.
We expected most respondents to be at least somewhat familiar with the types of policies
in our choice experiments. Energy efficiency and shifting to energy from renewable sources are
widely accepted goals in the US, the European Union and many other countries. The McKinsey
report (2009) considers energy efficiency a relatively untapped “resource” that can deliver
reductions in greenhouse gases at very low or even negative costs, and government expenditures
on energy efficiency and renewable energy program can be considerable. Allaire and Brown
(2012) estimate that expenditures on the 13 federal subsidy programs that most reduced CO 2
emissions totaled over $ 25 million in 2009, for an average cost of $209 per ton of CO 2
emissions reduced. The US Congressional Budget Office reports that in fiscal year 2015 tax
preferences (credits and deductions) to support the development, production, and use of fuels and
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energy technologies resulted in $15.8 billion in forgone revenues, and lawmakers appropriated
funds for $5.4 billion for the Department of Energy to fund the relevant spending programs.4
The European Commission has set goals to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by
2030 and 80-95% by 2050 (both compared to 1990 levels). Two main tools for accomplishing
such goas are renewables and improved energy efficiency, and these are two key pillars of
European Energy policy in their own right. The EU aims at a minimum 27% share of renewable
energy consumption and at least 27% energy savings with respect to the business-as-usual
scenario by 2030. A number of Directives define the broad strategy of the European Union in
this area, but broad discretion is left to each member state in terms of the actual measures to be
implemented. The Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) stipulates that each Member State (MS)
must put in place an Energy Efficiency Obligation (EEO) scheme, in order to fulfill the 1.5%
annual energy consumption reduction target.

Among other things, the EED also seeks to

promote renovation of residential and commercial buildings, energy efficiency goals in public
buildings, and efficient heating and cooling systems. The Energy Performance in Buildings
Directive (2010) contains other measures directed at promoting efficiency in residential energy
use such as minimum energy performance requirements (or building codes), energy performance
certificates, the obligation for buildings built after 2020 to be nearly zero-energy buildings, and
the provision of financial incentives.
In terms of the specific policy mechanisms, carbon taxes and incentives (subsidies) are
two well-known examples of instruments based on economic incentives and market mechanisms.
They are generally regarded as (potentially) efficient (Goulder and Parry, 2008, Williams III,

4

See https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/50980-Energy_Support.pdf.

6
2016), but only few countries have adopted carbon taxes, because they are either politically
unappealing or impractical.5, 6
By contrast, incentives to adopt renewables (such as home photovoltaics or other
microgeneration systems) or to finance energy-efficiency upgrades are offered by national or
local government at many locales. In Italy the current feed-in tariff regime was established in
2011, at a time when Italy was the fastest-growing solar market in the world, with 9,000 MW of
new installed capacity. The system features nine different tariff levels based on installation size,
the highest being reserved for small rooftop systems (€ 0.27/kWh), but is due to expire in
December 2016. Subsidies for energy-efficiency upgrades in the home are structured in the form
of tax credits, which were first established in 2007 (see Alberini et al., 2014, and Alberini and
Bigano, 2015).
Similar policies have been implemented over the years in the US and elsewhere.7 Energy
efficiency standards exist for many energy-using durables and existing and new buildings, and
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Several European countries have established carbon taxes, such as Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland (on heating fuels), and the UK. Finland introduced the world's
first carbon tax in 1990, initially with exemptions for specific sectors. Australia established a carbon tax in 2012.
Carbon pricing roughly applies to Australia's largest 500 emitters, which are companies that emit more than 25,000
tons of carbon dioxide or supply or use natural gas. Initially set at $23 per metric ton of CO 2, the tax was repealed in
2014.
6
Current carbon taxes and permit trading programs only cover about 12% of global emissions (Parry, 2014). Current
research suggests that their levels may be far from optimal: In some cases the tax rate is too high compared to the
actual external damages (Parry and Small, 2005), and in others too low (e.g. Máca et al. 2012; Somanathan et al.
2014). The coverage of different sectors also varies. According to OECD (2016), the effective carbon tax (that
implied by the excise taxes levied on energy, fuels, etc.) in the residential and commercial sector covers a relatively
small proportion of the carbon emissions base (only 17%) compared to 98% of emission priced in road, 36% in
electricity generation, or 26% in industry sector. The average effective carbon rate from carbon tax and ETS
together for all 41 OECD countries is € 31 per ton of CO2, but the overlap between the two instruments is limited to
a very narrow proportion of the emissions base. OECD (2016) further finds that in Italy in 2012 about 93% of
carbon emissions were priced, but a large share of these priced emissions was from road transport. Overall, about
40% were priced at an effective carbon price above € 30 per ton of CO2, which represents “a conservative minimum
estimate of the damage that results from emitting one tonne of carbon…” We remind the reader that there is no
explicit carbon tax in Italy but excise taxes on motor fuels, coal, gas and electricity as required by European
legislation result in an average effective carbon tax rates on CO2 of about € 76. About 80% of the emissions from
the residential and commercial sectors are priced at a rate of € 57–65. On average, however, the average effective
tax rate in Italy is about is about € 20.2 in the residential and commercial sector in Italy, and € 16 in heating and
process energy (OECD 2016).

7
approaches based on disclosure of a good’s energy performance apply to many products,
including homes. The EU’s Energy Performance of Building Directive (2003, 2010) requires
energy efficiency certification and the display of energy efficiency labels in homes and buildings
at the time of purchase/sale and rental agreements. Despite the wide application of the policies in
our choice experiments, our questionnaire included background information and examples of
real-life policies prior to the choice experiments
Briefly, we find that people are willing to pay for reductions in CO2 emissions, but their
WTP per ton varies dramatically, depending on the policy instrument, ranging from € 6 to 133
euro per ton. The lowest value is that associated with a carbon tax. In models that allow the WTP
to depend on both policy and individual characteristics, we find that the policy mechanism
changes the WTP per ton by up to € 78. Holding the policy mechanisms the same, individual
characteristics and climate change awareness are associated with a € 166-range in WTP per ton.
Support for a carbon tax is lowest among women without a college degree and with no
awareness of climate change, for whom the WTP is even negative. Based on our survey results,
we conclude that the variation in WTP induced by the policy scenario is at least of the same
magnitude as that associated with sociodemographics and knowledge of climate change.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our approach.
Section 3 presents the econometric models, section 4 the data and section 5 estimation results.
Section 6 concludes.
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2. Approach
We study the public’s preferences for policies seeking to reduce CO2 emissions using a
survey-based approach, namely stated-preference choice experiments. In conjoint choice
experiments, study participants are asked to indicate which they prefer out of a set of K
alternatives, usually goods or policy packages, where K2. The alternatives are defined by a
finite set of attributes whose levels differ across alternatives.
In our choice experiments, the alternatives are policy packages described by four
attributes: i) the goal of the policy, i.e., addressing energy efficiency or promoting renewable
energy; ii) the policy mechanism(s) (which may entail one or more of the following: incentives,
taxes on fossil fuels, standards, or information); iii) the reduction in CO2 emissions per
household, expressed both in tons and as percentage reduction with respect to current emissions,
and iv) the cost of the policy to the respondent’s household. Items iii) and iv) are expressed as
per year for a total of 10 years.
We included attribute iii) and iv) because they are essential for computing the WTP per
ton of CO2. We included attributes i) and ii) because we are interested in assessing whether
people care about how emissions reductions are delivered, and earlier research on this issue is
limited.
Some studies have found that people generally tend to prefer policy instruments resulting
in lower prices of environmentally friendly products and services (e.g. subsidies for renewable
energy sources) over instruments that increase the prices of environmentally harmful goods (see
Schade and Schlag, 2003; Eriksson et al., 2006). A policy instruments labelled as “tax” is found
to be significantly less acceptable than an unlabelled policy instrument, even when they have the
same characteristics (Brännlund and Persson, 2012; Cole and Brännlund, 2009; Kallbekken et al.
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2011). People who are opposed to taxes may, however, be mollified by policies that propose to
recycle the revenue from those taxes into environmentally-oriented measures, such as support for
public transport and alternative means of transportation, development of clean technologies, etc.
(Saelen and Kallbekken, 2011). In a voting experiment, Cherry et al. (2012) found that subjects
prefer taxes over regulation and subsidies over taxes. This study and others show that opposition
against an instrument is strengthened when the instrument is viewed as coercive (Attari et al.,
2009, Baron and Jurney, 1993, Jakobsson et al. 2000, or Steg et al. 2006).
In each choice question, respondents were asked to choose between two hypothetical
policies and the status quo, and so in our survey K=3. Attributes and attribute levels are
summarized in table 1. Prior to the choice experiments, we told respondents that the CO2
emissions associated with home electricity and heating fuel usage come to a total of 5 tons a year
for the average Italian household. We then asked them to consider two major approaches to
reducing CO2 emissions from homes and buildings. One is to improve energy efficiency, and the
other is increasing the share of renewable energy. Respondents were reminded of other benefits
of these approaches, including savings for the consumers, improved energy security, and others.
Our hypothetical policies would deliver reductions in emissions of 5, 10, 20 and 33%
with respect to this baseline, which correspond to 0.25, 0.5, 1, and 1.65 ton CO2 per year,
respectively. The cost amounts were selected so as to cover a broad range of possible willingness
to pay figures per ton of CO2 emissions reductions (14 – 1200 Euro per ton). The current
situation (status quo) was clearly presented to the respondent as delivering no emissions
reductions at zero additional cost to the respondent’s household.
In each discrete choice task, the respondents were asked to choose between policy A,
policy B and the status quo. Choosing the status quo implied no additional costs to the

10
household, and no reductions in the current level of CO2 emissions. A sample choice card is
displayed in figure 1.
Respondents engaged in a total of five such choice tasks, then moved on to a series of
debriefing questions. These were followed by a number of questions meant to assess the
respondent’s beliefs and information about climate change. Specifically, they were asked to
indicate their agreement or disagreement with a number of statements about climate change. We
used a Likert scale where 1 denotes complete disagreement and 5 means complete agreement.
The statements were non-technical in nature, and ranged from naming CO2 as one of the most
important greenhouse gases to claiming “I have never heard of climate change before.”
The choice experiments, the debriefing questions and the climate change belief questions
were placed roughly in the middle of a questionnaire that focused on energy use and recent
energy-efficiency upgrades in the respondent’s home. The questionnaire ended with the usual
questions about socio-demographics (family status, education, income, etc.).
The questionnaire was self-administered using computer-assisted web interviewing
(CAWI) by a total of 1005 respondents recruited from the population that owns and resides in
homes built before or in 2000. We focused on this segment of the population (roughly 84% of
the entire population of Italy) because we were interested in energy-efficiency upgrades and
retrofits, and these typically happen when a home is sufficiently old. About one-third of the
sample had done one or more such retrofits within the last 5 years, one-third 5-15 years prior to
the survey, and the remaining one-third none whatsoever. The survey was conducted nationwide
in July 2014.
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3. Econometric Models
We posit that the responses to the conjoint choice questions are driven by a random
utility model (McFadden, 1974), where the indirect utility V from an alternative depends on the
attributes of that alternative. The attributes may also appeal to a different extent to different
individuals. Formally, we assume that
(1)

Vij  1  GOAL ij  CO 2ij   2  INSTR ijα 3  Xi α 4     ( y  COSTij )

where subscripts i and j denote the individual and the alternative, respectively, and GOAL is a
vector of dummies denoting the goal of the policy (to abate CO2 emissions by promoting energy
efficiency (EE) or renewables (RES)). In practice, this means that we are including alternativespecific intercepts in the discrete choice model. Variable CO 2 is the CO2 emissions reduction
per household delivered by the policy (in tons per year), y is the respondent’s household income
and COST is the cost of the program to the respondent’s household (euro per year). In equation
(1), the ’s are the marginal utilities and β is the marginal utility of income.
As shown in equation (1), we allow the marginal utility of emissions reductions to
depend on the policy instruments, including a carbon tax, incentives, standards (here captured by
vector INSTR) and information-based approaches (such as campaigns or labels (INFO)). We
also allow the marginal utility of the emissions reductions to depend on a vector X of individual
characteristics and beliefs about climate change.
On appending an i.i.d. standard type I extreme value error term, , it can be shown that
the probability that alternative k is chosen is
3

(2)

Pr(k )  exp(Vk ) /  exp(V j ) ,
j 1
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which is the contribution to the likelihood in a conditional logit model (see Train, 2003).
In our questionnaire, each respondent is faced with T=5 choice cards, and the log
likelihood function is
(3)

N T
3

log L   yitk  ln  exp(Vitk )
i 1 t 1 k 1


3

 exp(V
j 1

itj


)  .


where yitk is a binary indicator denoting whether respondent i selects option k in choice exercise
t. All coefficients are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. In practice,  is estimated
by entering only cost, rather than residual income (y-COST), in the model, so that the estimation
routine produces the negative of  as the coefficient on cost.
If 3 and 4 are all equal to zero, then the willingness to pay for each ton of CO2
emissions avoided is ˆ 2 / ˆ , where the “hats” denote the maximum likelihood estimates. In this
paper, however, we are specifically interested in seeing if the WTP per ton changes with the
policy or the characteristics of the individual, or both—and by how much. This helps us explore
whether the range of WTP per ton of CO2 observed in the literature is due to the features of the
policies individuals were asked to consider, or the populations being surveyed, or both.
We also wish to study what factors influence support for a carbon tax. Candidate factors
include gender (to be male), education (to have a university degree, college), not having heard of
climate change before (neverheard), or believing that climate change means global cooling
(cooling).8 The reference category in model (1) is a female without university degree who is
informed about climate change. Quantity ˆ 2 / ˆ is thus the WTP per ton of CO2 emissions
reduced for such a respondent. The WTP for another type of respondent is obtained by adding
the coefficient(s) on the interaction between CO2 and the individual characteristic(s) of that
8
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respondents, all of them divided by ̂ . For example, the WTP per ton under a carbon tax is

(ˆ 2  ˆ3,TAX ) / ˆ ,

and

that

under

standards

and

for

college-educated

woman

is

(ˆ 2  ˆ 3,STDS  ˆ 4,COLLEGE ) / ˆ .
To see if the WTP per ton varies with the policy instrument to a different extent for
persons with different characteristics, we fit the following RUM:

(4)

Vij  1  GOAL ij  CO 2ij   2  INSTR ijα 3  Xi α 4  Xi  INSTR ijα5     ( y  COSTij )

where the reference category and the coefficient  2 still refer to a female without university
degree but with knowledge of climate change, and to information-based policies. Notice that this
model entails two-way as well as three-way interactions between emissions reductions, policies
and individual characteristics.
Finally, we allow for the possibility that respondents may favor or oppose certain policies
regardless of how much they deliver and cost. We examine this possibility with the model:
(5)

Vij  1  GOAL ij  INSTR ijδ  INSTR ij  Xij θ   2  CO 2ij  1  ( y  COSTij ) .

This model allows for such favor or opposition to depend on individual characteristics of the
respondent.

4. The Data
Descriptive statistics of the respondents are reported in table 2. Men account for some
61% of the sample,9 and, in terms of educational attainment, over a third of the respondents have

9

The questionnaire invited a member of the family who is familiar with energy bills and energy efficiency updates
at home to participate in the survey. This is most likely the reason why men are overrepresented in our sample.

14
a college or post-graduate degree and some 48% of the respondents completed high school.10
Income levels are similar to those in the population (Banca d’Italia, 2014), at least for those
respondents who did report their income (87.5% of the sample).
When asked about their preferences for mitigation policies, it is reasonable to expect that
people’s stated-preference responses should be affected by their knowledge of climate change
and concern about it. The shares of the sample ratings about climate change are displayed in
table 3. This table suggests that most of the Italian respondents have heard of climate change
before and that very few dispute its existence. However, there is low or no correlation between
the two basic measures of knowledge of climate change used in our empirical models and
respondent education (see table 4). This bodes well for statistical analysis below (as it reduces
collinearity) but is somewhat surprising.11
As shown in table 5, the responses to the policy choice questions appear to be reasonable:
Program A was selected about 40% of the times, program B 37%, and the status quo 23% of the
times. Table 6 shows that the responses are stable over the choice exercises. We did not find any
obvious evidence of anomalies or unusual response patterns.

5. Results.
Our estimation results indicate that the association between policy attributes and the
probability of selecting any one of the alternatives in a choice card is almost always statistically
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By contrast, population statistics from Italy indicate that only 12.30% of the population has a university degree
and that about 29% has a high school diploma. Our Italy sample thus over-represents highly educated adults.
11
To further elaborate on this, the rating for the statement that the earth is globally cooling is only weakly associated
with education, in that the share of people that disagree completely is about 5 percentage points higher among
college-educated respondents, and the share that agree completely is about 5 percentage points lower among the
college educated. Education does not appear to be related to the rating of the statement “I have never heard of
climate change before.”
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significant, regardless of the functional form we selected for the RUM (whether equation (1) or
the others).
We begin our discussion of the results with the simplest version of RUM of equation (1),
namely one where the individual characteristics X are omitted (in other words, 4=0).12 As
shown in table 7, top panel, the implied WTP per ton of CO2 emissions reductions ranges by two
orders of magnitude—from 6.44 to 133.15 Euro. It is lowest with a carbon tax and highest with
incentives. While standards and incentives are similarly regarded by the respondents (Wald test
1.54, p value 0.22), and incentives and information-based approaches are weakly statistically
different (Wald test 5.54, p value 0.02), the figures for all of these policies are dramatically
different from those for the carbon tax (Wald test: 34.12, p value < 0.00001).
The results displayed in Appendix A.1, column (B) refer to a variant of the RUM in
equation (1) where the 3 are restricted to zero, allowing us to focus on the effect of
demographics and climate change beliefs. The WTP figures are displayed in table 7, bottom
panel. Clearly, there is a ten-fold difference between the lowest and highest WTP per ton values
and the WTP range is even larger compared to its counterpart in the top panel. Education and
climate change knowledge have a major impact on the WTP per ton. To illustrate, a woman with
high-school diploma and at least basic information on climate change is willing to pay 86 Euro
per ton of CO2 emissions avoided. This figure increases to 144 Euro for a woman with similar
background but college-degree education, and drops to 17.57 Euro for a woman who is
completely uninformed about climate change and has no college degree. Men hold
systematically higher WTP values. For example, a college-educated men who is informed about
climate change is prepared to pay 185 Euro per ton of CO2 emissions avoided, and even an
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Full estimation results are displayed in table A.1 in Appendix A, column (A).
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uninformed man without college education would be prepared to pay 59 Euro per ton, although
this figure is not statistically different from zero.
We are, of course, especially interested in whether a given policy is more or less
appealing to a certain group of individuals. The results from the broadest specification of the
RUM in equation (1), where both 3 and 4 are unrestricted, are displayed in table A.1 in
appendix A, column (C). As summarized in table 8, their implications in terms of WTP are
striking: Opposition to a carbon tax is extreme among the less highly educated persons in our
sample and persons with no knowledge of climate change, for whom the WTP can be even
negative (but statistically insignificant). All else the same, men are prepared to pay some 40 Euro
per ton more than women. Having a college degree translates into being willing to pay about 50
Euro more for each ton of CO2 emissions reduced. Incentives and standards are the policies for
which people are prepared to pay the largest amounts (up to 230 and 209 Euro per ton, among
college educated men). The carbon tax is worth 78 Euro per ton less than incentives.
We explore whether gender, education and climate change awareness are important in
influencing the acceptance of a carbon tax in table A.1, column (D), which corresponds to the
RUM in equation (4), but the coefficients on the three-way interaction terms are imprecisely
estimated and the only additional evidence with respect to the results in column (C) is the
especially strong opposition to a carbon tax on the part of those who have not heard of climate
change before. Additional specifications—such as variants on equation (5)—do not uncover any
additional evidence about the downright opposition to a carbon tax (see table A.2 in Appendix
A).
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6. Conclusions
We have used stated preference methods to study the determinants of heterogeneity in the
WTP per ton of CO2 emissions abated through mitigation policies. We have focused on
exploring whether heterogeneity in the WTP is due to the attributes of the policies or individual
characteristics of the respondents. We have found that both can induce large changes in the WTP
per ton. In our simplest specification, the WTP range across policies is € 127. In our broadest
specification, the WTP per ton values range between € -14 and 230, depending on the policy.
Holding the policy the same, the WTP per ton can increase by 300%, depending on the
individual characteristics and awareness of climate change of the respondents.
In our study, the policy-induced heterogeneity in WTP values and that associated with
individual characteristics and opinions on climate change are of roughly the same magnitude.
Our results can be compared, for example, with those in Kotchen et al. (2013), who report that
the willingness to pay for a national climate change policy that reduces CO2 emissions by 17%
by 2020 does not vary much across a cap-and-trade program, a carbon tax and regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions. Age, education and political party affiliation are associated with
higher or lower WTP for certain policy mechanisms, but these differences disappeared when the
regressions control for whether climate change is actually taking place.
We found mixed evidence in terms of support for a carbon tax. The range of WTP values
in a carbon tax context ranged from practically zero to about € 151/ton, and was strongly
associated with education and knowledge of climate change. In general, the results from our
analysis are broadly consistent with preferences observed at other locales: Greenstone (2016)
reports that some 57% of Americans would support a carbon policy, whether a tax, a cap-andtrade, or regulations.
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Table 1. Summary of attributes and attribute levels used in the stated-preference choice
experiments.
Attribute
goal of the policy

attribute levels
energy efficiency, renewables

mechanism(s)

incentives, regulation, taxes on fossil fuels, informationbased approaches

number of
levels
2
7

reduction in CO2 emissions
(for each of 10 years)
0.25 tons (5%), 0.50 tons (10%), 1 ton (20%), 1.65 (33%)

4

cost to the household for 25, 50, 100, 300 Euro (Italy)
each of 10 years

4

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ sociodemographics.

Variable
gender:
Male
Education
high school diploma
college degree
Master's or PhD
Income (net annual household income)

Percent or sample
mean
61.59%
47.78%
26.47%
7.16%
€30,185
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Table 3. Respondents’ opinions about climate change. Percent of the sample that select each
rating score.
Statement

Completely
disagree
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Completely
Agree
5

12.14

10.45

32.34

27.46

17.61

2.29

5.47

25.17

36.82

30.25

1.69

5.07

29.15

36.72

27.36

1.69

5.47

29.75

35.02

28.06

1.49

5.97

33.33

37.61

21.59

Climate change doesn't exist

58.61

12.44

18.81

6.97

3.18

Actually, the Earth is globally cooling

27.96

18.51

39.5

9.25

4.78

I have never heard of climate change before

64.18

9.15

16.52

7.76

2.39

The Greenhouse effect is caused by a hole in the
atmosphere
Climate change is caused by excessive greenhouse
gas emissions
Climate change means that in the future the Earth
will be warmer
Carbon dioxide is one of the most important
greenhouse gases
Burning fossil fuels is the most important cause of
greenhouse gases

Table 4. Percentage of respondents who agreed or disagreed with climate change statements by
education
Strongly
disagree
1

2

Neutral
3

Strongly
agree
4

Pearson's 2
test

5

In reality the Earth is
cooling globally
without university degree
with university degree
I have never heard of
climate change before
without university degree
with university degree

25.83

17.42

39.92

9.98

6.85

30.16

19.64

39.07

8.5

2.63

62.43

9.00

17.03

8.22

3.33

65.99

9.31

15.99

7.29

1.42

2 (4)=12.35
p=0.015

2(4)=4.80
p=0.308
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Tables 5. Policy Choices made by the respondents.
Freq.
policy A
policy B
status quo
Total

1,992
1,869
1,164
5,025

Percent
39.64
37.19
23.16
100

Table 6. Responses by pair: frequencies and percentages of row totals.
response
Pair
Policy A
Policy B
Status Quo
Total
1
427
354
224
1,005
42.49
35.22
22.29
100
2
359
414
232
1,005
35.72
41.19
23.08
100
3
377
402
226
1,005
37.51
40
22.49
100
4
406
367
232
1,005
40.4
36.52
23.08
100
5
423
332
250
1,005
42.09
33.03
24.88
100
Total
1,992
1,869
1,164
5,025
39.64
37.19
23.16
100

25
Table 7. WTP per ton of CO2 figures based on two specifications of the RUM in equation (1).
All amounts in euro.
WTP per t CO2
Standard error.
(A) 4=0 Only policies
CARBON TAX

6.44

(11.26)

INCENTIVES

133.15***

(16.83)

STANDARDS

112.44***

(17.23)

95.24***

(16.26)

144.03***

(28.44)

no university, with knowledge

85.89***

(25.79)

with university, no knowledge

75.71

(50.77)

no university, no knowledge

17.57

(48.62)

INFO
(B) 3=0 Only individual
characteristics
…woman
with university, with knowledge

…man
with university, with knowledge

185.49***

(24.80)

no university, with knowledge

127.34***

(24.33)

with university, no knowledge

117.16**

(49.63)

59.02

(48.68)

no university, no knowledge

*** p value<0.01, ** p value<0.05, * p value<0.10
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Table 8. WTP estimates based in the RUM in equation (1), no restrictions on the coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses. All amounts in euro.
INCENTIVES

STANDARDS

INFO

TAX

+with university, with knowledge

190.59***
(31.62)

169.75***
(31.33)

155.91***
(31.10)

112.15***
(28.36)

+no university, with knowledge

133.81***
(28.59)

112.97***
(28.67)

99.13***
(28.6)

55.37**
(26.16)

+with university, no knowledge

121.13**
(51.7)

100.29*
(52.45)

86.45*
(51.76)

42.69
(50.87)

+no university, no knowledge

64.35
(49.17)

43.51
(50.17)

29.67
(49.56)

-14.08
(48.93)

+with university, with knowledge

230.26***
(28.83)

209.42***
(28.00)

195.58***
(27.57)

151.83***
(24.25)

+no university, with knowledge

173.49***
(27.88)

152.65***
(27.44)

138.81***
(27.19)

95.05***
(24.42)

+with university, no knowledge

160.81***
(50.84)

139.96***
(51.31)

126.13**
(50.52)

82.37*
(49.52)

+no university, no knowledge

104.03**
(49.57)

83.19*
(50.28)

69.35
(49.58)

25.59
(48.85)

…woman

…man

*** p value<0.01, ** p value<0.05, * p value<0.10
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Appendix A.
Table A.1. Estimation results for conditional logit models with two-way and three-way
interactions for CO2 emission reductions. 1,005 respondents, 5025 responses. Standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.
(A)
EE
RES

0.5049***
(0.0779)
0.721***
(0.0795)

CO2
CO2  TAX
CO2  INCENTIVES
CO2  STANDARDS
CO2  INFO

(B)

CO2  neverheard
CO2  college
CO2  male

0.4211***
(0.0777)
0.6286***
(0.08)
0.3252***
(0.0922)
-0.1435***
(0.0448)
0.1138**
(0.0468)
0.0454
(0.0508)

0.4218***
(0.0777)
0.6298***
(0.0801)
0.2292**
(0.1039)
0.0155
(0.0823)
0.1163**
(0.0469)
0.0434
(0.0507)

-0.0291
(0.1273)
-0.1926
(0.142)
0.1887**
(0.0911)
0.1345
(0.0933)

-0.0283
(0.1273)
-0.1995
(0.1419)
0.1863**
(0.0911)
0.1301
(0.0934)

-0.0032***
(0.0002)

-0.0033***
(0.0002)

-0.0103
(0.1549)
-0.2278
(0.1709)
0.285***
(0.1071)
0.2067*
(0.1093)
-0.0288
(0.1334)
0.0547
(0.1496)
-0.1677**
(0.0848)
-0.1287
(0.0873)
-0.0033***
(0.0002)

CO2  TAX  cooling
CO2  TAX  neverheard
CO2  TAX  college
CO2  TAX  male
COST
LogLik
Wald chi2

-0.0032***
(0.0002)
-5183.29
306.55

*** p value<0.01, ** p value<0.05, * p value<0.10

(D)

0.4211***
(0.0775)
0.636***
(0.0798)
0.2788***
(0.0821)

0.0209
(0.0365)
0.4321***
(0.0472)
0.3649***
(0.0498)
0.309***
(0.0488)

CO2  cooling

(C)

-5163.52
302.66

-5152.00
319.61

-5148.40
323.46
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Table A.2. Estimation results for conditional logit models with two-way interactions between
individual-specific characteristics and carbon tax (A) or incentives (B). 1005 respondents, 5025
responses. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.
(A)
CARBON TAX
0.3511***
EE
(0.1088)
0.5444***
RES
(0.1089)
0.4296***
CO2
(0.0404)
-0.1686*
Incentives
(0.0915)
0.2902***
Tax
(0.0736)
0.1179
Standards
(0.0749)
Policy indicated in the
0.1375*
header of column (A) or (B) (0.08)
0.0136
…  male
(0.1005)
0.0434
…  college
(0.0956)
0.0711
…  neverheard
(0.1687)
-0.0511
…  cooling
(0.1418)
-0.0033***
COST
(0.0002)
LogLik
Wald chi2

-5156.68
328.44

*** p value<0.01, ** p value<0.05, * p value<0.10

(B)
INCENTIVES
0.3513***
(0.1088)
0.546***
(0.109)
0.4287***
(0.0404)
-0.1412***
(0.0466)
0.1174
(0.1068)
0.1193
(0.075)
0.1389*
(0.08)
0.1416
(0.1056)
0.1859*
(0.1028)
-0.0848
(0.1722)
0.0198
(0.1529)
-0.0033***
(0.0002)
-5152.91
331.13
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